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Abstract
With few exceptions, the European Council closed Europe for non-citizen travellers on 17 March 2020 because of the
Covid-19 pandemic. Many African countries, including Nigeria, have placed travel restrictions on or completely shut their
borders to both travellers who want to enter the country and citizens who want to leave. These decisions affect many
intending migrants seeking a way to reach Europe. Health and socioeconomic uncertainties related to lockdowns, bor-
der closure, and in some cases travel restrictions directly affect the dynamics of decision-making by migrants. This article
employs in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to explore the perception of Nigerians who intend to migrate
considering the influence of Covid-19. The study focuses on Nigerian migrants but touches on Nigerians in transit who
are trapped in Niger en route to Europe through Libya and Morocco. While border closure by most of the sending and
receiving countries led to a decrease in the intention of migrants to travel, Covid-19 as a pandemic does not significantly
influencemigrants’ decisions primarily because of its global presence, merely leading to delays. In conclusion, after border
reopening, intercontinental migration is expected to increase in both volume and intensity.
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1. Introduction
Covid-19 has become a health pandemic, but its impacts
transcends health sectors and affect socioeconomic,
political, diplomatic and, not least, migration trends.
Lockdowns, travel restrictions, curfews, industrial clo-
sure and social distancing aremaking economic activities
very difficult in most countries and completely impossi-
ble in some (World Bank, 2020d). This affects transporta-
tion especially in regions where entry into and exit from
a country is banned. In this article we look at the case of
Nigeria (John, 2020).
Studying the trend of migration in times of Covid-19
and its concomitant impacts becomes pertinent to unveil
the effects of the pandemic in constraining migrants
from travelling out, the impact of movement restrictions
on labour shortages in receiving countries, as well as
how anti-migration groups can exploit the fear created
by the pandemic and masquerade it as a potential solu-
tion to a global health problem by pushing for strict leg-
islations against migration (Natter, Czaika, & Haas, 2020).
Exploring the potentials of these dynamics can provide
insights that could aid policy development and prepa-
ration for a post-Covid-19 migration world—where fear,
stigmatisation and global health politics are expected to
govern migration, or at least influence it. It therefore
points to the imperative of studying the uncertainties of
migration amidst non-conflict restrictions such as tempo-
rary border closure.
Research linking migration to Covid-19 focus heavily
on predicting the risk exposures of migrants and hosts
(Ahsan, Iqbal, Khan, & Mobarak, 2020) and how the
pandemic may change perception of people from hos-
tility towards migrants to the realisation of human one-
ness and acceptance (Xhardez, 2020), while some topics
dwell on its impact on laws and policies. Some studies
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take a broader and generalised study of the impact of
Covid-19 on migration including its effects on labour
migration and the potential loss of migrant workforce in
industries, probability of increase in inequality including
racism and social exclusion, possible support for politi-
cians with anti-immigrant far right ideology which could
shut the door against millions of vulnerable migrants
and resultant increase in irregular migration (Yayboke,
2020). While (Ramji-Nogales & Lang, 2020) and Yayboke
(2020) heavily rely on anecdotes and policy briefs, this
article explores the perception of intendingmigrants and
documented their experiences, feeling, fears, hopes and
thoughts. The survey was limited to Nigerian migrants
that intend to migrate to Europe, which makes it par-
ticularly confined to African experiences of both regu-
lar and irregular migration patterns as they are affected
by the pandemic. This article documents how intending
migrants perceive the effects of Covid-19 on their deci-
sion to migrate, the conditions they live in transit coun-
tries and their expectations in a post-Covid-19 world.
2. Objectives of the Study
Our main objective was to examine the perception of
intending Nigerian migrants on border closing due to
the Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on migration. Our
main goals were as follows:
1. Examine the effect of Covid-19 on Nigerians’ deci-
sion to migrate to Europe.
2. Assess the socioeconomic conditions of migrants
on transit.
3. Examine post-Covid-19 expectations of intending
Nigerian migrants.
3. Theory
“International migration…is continuously on the rise
in an increasingly globalized context with substantial
implications for population health policy and research”
(Hossin, 2020). This statement captures vividly the intri-
cate relationship between migration, policy change and
the real or perceived health challenges that migrants
present in the health dynamics of their receiving pop-
ulations. Lockdowns, social distancing, intra-city move-
ment restrictions and international travel bans brought
untold difficulties to economic endeavours, leading to
layoffs, diminishing economic activities, standstills and
the outright closure of companies and other group asso-
ciations (World Bank, 2020a). This foretells significant
change, not only regarding migrant labour dynamics but
also onmatters of social acceptance or exclusion, stigma-
tization and racism.
Thus, while Covid-19 is a health issue, it has implica-
tions on all aspects of human life, including the economy,
politics and policymaking,migration and immobility. The
pandemic presents far-right politicians in receiving coun-
tries with ample opportunity to push anti-immigrant
policies that could restrict mobility (Gagnon, 2020).
Justifiably, the weak testing capacity of countries in the
Global South could render people migrating to Europe
from Africa and Asia susceptible to discrimination, exclu-
sion, denial or outright violence (Ahsan et al., 2020).
Remittances are major sources of foreign exchange
in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. With the sud-
den stoppage of economic activities in Europe, increase
in the rate of poverty in sending nations can be rea-
sonably expected. This can constitute a push factor
and fuel interest to migrate especially to countries that
are anticipated to be able to bounce back from the
economic effects of the pandemic. Within Sub-Saharan
Africa, Nigeria remains the highest recipient of remit-
tances (with $23.8 billion in 2019) far ahead of Ghana
and Kenya (with $3.4 billion and $2.8 billion respectively;
World Bank, 2020a). With a population of 200 million
people, an increase in poverty and deprivation in Nigeria
is likely to bring about alarming consequences, such as
the fuelling of existing conflicts like Boko Haram insur-
gency in the Northeast, IPOB secessionist movements
in the Niger-Delta and the Farmers-Herders conflict in
North Central regions, all of which can push more peo-
ple towards emigration.
This article interrogates the potency of Covid-19 in
altering migration dynamics among intending Nigerian
migrants who seek to travel to Europe but were inad-
vertently constrained by the pandemic and its concomi-
tant travel policy changes. Do migrants respond to these
restrictions by shelving their intention tomove to Europe,
or do they only bring their intentions to a temporary halt,
pending lifting of travel bans?
3.1. Methods and Data
Datawas collected from intendingNigerianmigrantswho
are constrained by the pandemic and forced to stay and
those who commenced irregular migration from Nigeria
to Europe but got stranded in Niger republic en route
to Europe via Libya/Morocco. The data were collected
in two major streams, first from three officials of the
Nigerian Immigration Service, then from interviews to 18
intendingmigrants. There was also one session of a focus
group discussion held with sevenmigrants trapped in the
Republic of the Niger. Purposive and snowball sampling
were employed to identify a total of 28 respondents—
10 in Nigeria and 18 in Niger. Respondents were identi-
fied through a snowball exercise where one respondent
led us to the next. The group discussion in Niger was
the result of time constraints: The seven migrants were
not covered individually because they were working in
a building site and we could only interview them during
their one-hour break. Out of the 28 respondents, 21 are
male and seven are female. They were engaged in dis-
cussions and the data collected were analysed using the-
matic narrative analysis of stakeholder submissions.
Respondents were given full freedom to choose
whether to be interviewed or not and the right to
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disengage at any point as well as the freedom not to
answer any question theymight not be comfortablewith.
Conditional consent was obtained from those that par-
ticipated in the survey based on the principle of ‘do no
harm’ and a pledge of utmost confidentiality. Those
who did not agree were not interviewed. Transcribed
interviews were the main focus of the analysis with
emphasis on contents that offered insights into the main
research questions. Interview contents were then com-
pared against the research questions to identify pat-
terns, which were latter grouped into sub-themes and
presented in narratives. The identified themes were
then analysed. Some statements that summarised com-
mon grounds are picked and presented in this arti-
cle. The main theme of the interviews was to exam-
ine the extent to which Covid-19 and its concomitant
travel restrictions affect the willingness of intending
Nigerian migrants to reach Europe. We assess the hin-
drances that inhibit Nigerianmigrants’ movements, their
fears, expectations and plans towards achieving their
travel objectives.
The responses of all Nigerian intending migrants
who aim to reach Europe are often presented as one:
Although the data were collected from them individu-
ally, the analysis focuses on commonalities and does
not systematically discuss individual cases. Doing so
respects the wish of real anonymity among the partic-
ipants, because almost all of those who travel through
Niger to Europe are irregular migrants.
4. Findings: How Covid-19 Border Closure Affects
Migration Decisions among Nigerian Migrants
Interviews with migrants who are still in Nigeria show
that the lockdown in the major cities of Abuja and Lagos
halted the formal processes of regular migration, making
it impossible for migrants to travel legally. However, they
remain firm on their decision to settle in Europe, thereby
considering the hitches as only temporary. A 33-year-old
migrant opined:
Consular offices were closed indefinitely, which
means even if we want to go ahead with preparations
and wait for the borders to be opened, we cannot do
that. This simply means everything is halted, but we
know it is temporary.
This also indicates that though many migrants travel
through irregular ways, a number of them pursue their
European dreams through the formal, regular patterns.
However, consular offices of many European countries
resumed after relative successes against the pandemic
(Artis, Carlei, & Bouteller, 2020; Chike, 2020).
Regardless of Covid-19 and its associated travel
restrictions, most West African countries exempt trans-
porters of food and medication from travel restrictions,
prompting some irregular migrants to attempt andmove
on lorries to the next destination. There are stories of
success among migrants trapped in Agadez and Dirkou
in Niger. Around two thirds of the respondents did not
have intention of cancelling their migration plans; they
only consider temporarily postponing them. About one
third of respondents wanted to cancel their travel plans
for different reasons largely due to the economic hard-
ship wrought by Covid-19 and general economic turbu-
lence in transit countries. This is supported by the recent
research that reveals that migrants are heavily affected
by lockdowns and movement restrictions (Migration
Data Portal, 2020). However, after lifting the lockdown
and travel restrictions, the situation may change due to
the possible reduction of economic pressures and resur-
facing of opportunities that will support the journey.
A respondent remarked: “We are praying and waiting
to see what God will do, but if the situation does not
improve, I will go back to my farm.”
Maintaining their intention to migrate means wait-
ing for the lifting of travel restrictions or moving through
illegal, difficult and dangerous routes. In other words,
due to the historical and cultural similarities of West
Africans and the porous borders between countries,
migrants take irregular routes and evade official checks
at the borders to arrive at their next transit countries.
Nigeria shares a border of 1,497 kilometres with Niger,
1,690 kilometres with Cameroon and 87 kilometres with
Chad. Along this stretch there are more than 1500
illegal crossing routes that are increasingly difficult to
monitor, especially because of the security challenges
posed by armed groups (Bearzotti, Geranio, Keresztes, &
Müllerová, 2015). This answers why the European Union
and other international actors like the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Spanish Guardia
Civil, the German GIZ and the European Development
Fund invested heavily in the provision of training and
equipment to intensify and strengthen border controls in
African countries in order to guard against migration and
terrorism (Frowd, 2014), as well asmaking arrangements
for Sub-Saharan countries to readmit returning migrants
and clamp down on irregular migration in exchange for
development aid—all as means of externalising border
control (Haas, 2008). A secondary decision that migrants
mostly take is paying for services of travel agents that
smuggle travellers to Europe and end up dehumanising
migrants on theway and at their destinations. A stranded
34-year oldmalemigrant in Agadez narrated how hewas
separated from his wife and young child:
We paid N470,000 [corresponding to about 15
months’minimumwage inNigeria] to an agent to take
us to Europe. When we reached Morocco we were
separated into four groups to avoid being detected if
we move as a large group. The group of my wife and
daughter entered Spain, but our group was arrested
by Moroccan authorities and detained for months
before we were deported back home. I worked hard
to save money and reunite with my family and hav-
ing reached here, the borders are closed because of
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Corona, but we hope it will be opened soon, and we
will reach Morocco.
Caused by socioeconomic problems in Africa, the
scourge of human trafficking and smuggling along the
Mediterranean routes has been a serious problem in
West Africa for decades (Fleshman, 2009; Sawadogo,
2012; Triandafyllidou &McAuliffe, 2018), which resulted
in concerted efforts by African and European nations
to tackle it (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
[UNODC], 2018). Regardless this collaboration, the signif-
icance ofmigration led scholars to conclude that “despite
lip service being paid to combating illegal migration for
political and diplomatic reasons, neither European nor
African states have much genuine interest in stopping
migration” (Haas, 2008). In addition, while the exter-
nalization of borders by European authorities facilitates
the goal of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), which is to optimise regular migration
to Europe, it also affects free intra-regional movement
in the region, which is also one of the objectives of
ECOWAS (2008). Argued in another way, the prevalence
of human trafficking and smuggling across the Sahara to
Europe only garnered momentum when European coun-
tries sought to externalize border controls and encour-
agedAfrican countries to illegalizemovements across the
Sahara regardless of the ECOWAS free movement proto-
cols (Brachet, 2018), resulting not only in failure of the
European fight against ‘invasion,’ but also in an increased,
albeit clandestine, movement across the Mediterranean.
This is especially so after the adoption by Niger of a
law against smuggling and trafficking of migrants on
11 May 2015 (UNODC, 2020b). The law was called the
Law 2015–36 and adopted the Palermo Declaration that
prohibits the smuggling of migrants by land, air and sea
(Perrin, 2020). Before Law 2015–36, the Agadez route
supplied about 65,000migrants per year with about 45%
coming fromNigeria alone, andmost ofwhomwere from
the southern part of the country (BenSaad, 2003).
In some cases, the decision to migrate is affected
by fear of social rejection while in Europe. Though
most migrants believed Covid-19 is neither prevalent in
Nigeria nor in any of the transit countries, they are afraid
that they are likely to face social rejection on account
of Covid-19 suspicions. Regardless, they are confident of
finding their way to be accepted provided they can prove
their health status and maintain adherence to preven-
tive requirements as they are doing in Niger. A 25-year
old female migrant in Dirkou posited: “Someone told me
blacks find it difficult to be accepted and because our
countries do not have good hospitals they will think all
migrants are Covid-19 positive, but I believe they will
understand.” This may not be unexpected as migrants
have always been stigmatised in crisis situations (IOM,
2020a) and during Covid-19, xenophobia and racism are
increasing in Europe (Vertovec, 2020) and could lead to
political, social and medical exclusion or even violence
and crime (KAICIID, 2020).
5. Migrants Live in Difficult Socioeconomic Conditions
during Covid-19
Niger has had open access to health facilities for all for-
eigners even before Covid-19 and placed virtually no
employment restrictions apart from strategic organisa-
tions like security establishments like the army and the
police, the civil service and elective offices. Migrants
therefore work as porters, in the fashion industry, mar-
keting of wares, on the farms and in private offices. This
they do to feed, clothe and pay for rent—most of the
migrants have dependents, either their own children,
old parents or siblings which they hope to send remit-
tances back for their upkeep. However, only very few of
the respondents are migrating with a dependent, which
increases the burden of surviving the journey especially
for an irregularmigrant. This has been the trend formore
than a decade and is not expected to change anytime
soon (Charriere & Fresia, 2008) leading to the conclu-
sion that a quarter of all African migrants are children
(UNICEF, 2019).
Around one in five of the respondents who were still
in Nigeria, butwho could not go back to their place of res-
idence due to the interstate ban imposed in April 2020,
engaged in petty trading along the Jibia–Dan Isa border:
They commonly partake in selling second hand clothes,
phone accessories and fruits. One respondent works as
labourer in a construction site. These small-scale activi-
ties are common among both immigrants and emigrants
in the country (Afolayan, 2009) and are mostly under-
stood as temporary measures to earn income for food
without deflating what was initially budgeted to finance
the ‘European dream.’
Migrants also face the dangers of human smuggling,
where traffickers capitalise on migrants’ desperation to
feed their illegal businesses (Triandafyllidou &McAuliffe,
2018; UNODC, 2018, 2020a) with the proportion of
female migrants increasing rapidly and, in most cases,
ending in prostitution networks (UNODC, 2011). One of
the female respondents in Dirkou (Niger) posited that:
A travel agent askedme to pay N300,000 [equivalents
of 10 months’ minimum wage in Nigeria] for him to
take me to Gibraltar [before Covid-19]. I paid half and
some men told me he could be a Yan Jigilan mutane
[trafficker], so when I asked him to refund my money
he said since I don’t trust him I should go and trust
those who distracted me.
In times of movement restrictions, migrants, especially
women, are prone to trafficking and easy subjects of sex-
ual abuse. Shelley (2014) reported that 12,500 women,
about half of all prostitutes in Italy, are Nigerian women
that are trafficked into the country. Human traffick-
ers could be registered travel agents or disguised as
one to gain the confidence of potential victims. When
uncertainty is so high, trust becomes pertinent in tak-
ing decision to wobble through uncertain waters and
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reach Europe or distrust the ‘agents’ and stay foot.
The travel agents replicate their experiences of finding a
way through, especially within Africa where border offi-
cials pretend to allow legal travellers loaded on trucks to
legal destinations and “pretend to ignore the final des-
tination” (BenSaad, 2003). Smuggling of migrants gen-
erally increases by the day in both volume and sophis-
tication (Anderson, 2016). The Nigerian groups are par-
ticularly noted to be highly structured: They try sev-
eral methods of crossing over (UNODC, 2011) and hold
the record of most success stories in reaching Europe
(BenSaad, 2003). However, the fact that migrants are
willingly engaging with the services of smugglers indi-
cates that they may not be truly victims of traffickers.
Sometimes they initiate the journey themselves, finance
it and partner with the traffickers to facilitate their mis-
sion, as observed by Haas (2008).
All the migrants interviewed in Nigeria and the
Republic of the Niger stated that they adhered to
Covid-19 preventive measures provided by the coun-
tries. Indeed, the migrants I talked to in Niger expressed
concerns that not all those who have shown signs of
the disease are tested to ascertain their health status.
However, they do not consider it a sign of discrimina-
tion against the migrants because the same limited test-
ing also applies to citizens, primarily due to the short-
age of laboratories that conduct the test in the country.
Furthermore, “to reduce spread of the pandemic, non-
governmental organisations such as IOM stepped up to
create awareness and encourage preventivemeasures to
protect stranded migrants in the country” (IOM, 2020b).
Consequently, this resulted in emotional and physical
stress because of the fear of infection and the knowledge
that they are far away from relatives and their govern-
ment, as well as the sudden change in ways of life espe-
cially being confined to one’s room for a long time.
6. Migrants Have Mixed Expectations Regarding
Post-Covid-19 Situations
Few migrants have the feeling that the economic cri-
sis brought by the pandemic may result in rejec-
tion of migrants at workplaces due to job scarcity in
European countries. It is predicted that Covid-19will drive
migrants to further unemployment and underemploy-
ment (Guadagno, 2020) with young migrants more likely
to hold informal jobs and likely to be plunged into food
and nutritional insecurity (Food and Agriculture Organisa-
tion, 2020). The majority are very confident of getting a
job and being integrated into European society once they
arrive at the shores of Europe. Nevertheless, the hopes
are neither built on reliable travel guidance nor any plan,
but on hearsay and expectations, including scenes from
European films. A 26-year oldmigrant in Agadez said: “We
are seeing how they live their lives on TV, and if you com-
pare it to our own, you can only hope to be there.’’
Backlog of visa and travel applications may compli-
cate regularmigration processes and could easily spur an
increase in the cases of irregular migration giving travel
agents enough preys to feed on. As one respondent put
it: “Many of us are waiting to apply for visa but some
of us are resorting to travel agents but their fees are
exorbitant.” Increase in human trafficking is therefore a
likely occurrence, especially across the Western Sahara,
because the European externalisation of border control
stepped up control measures in the Sahara to an extent
that even legitimate travels are now made difficult by
instruments such as Law 2015–36. Such restrictions are
pushing travel agents to devise means of circumventing
the laws by increasing the sophistication of human smug-
gling (Perrin, 2020; UNODC, 2020b). However, one of
the respondents had a contrasting view: “What my elder
brother used to send back home has stopped and it is all
because he lost his job due to this Corona, so I am think-
ing of whether I can really get job if I join him in Valencia.”
Hence, he sounds discouragedby the hard economic real-
ities of receiving nations.
7. Discussion
It is established that Covid-19 halts both regular and
irregularmigration due to the lockdown of cities and con-
sular services as well as cross border travel restrictions
that limits mobility of irregular migrants (Chike, 2020;
Migration Data Portal, 2020; Yayboke, 2020). However,
this points to only a temporary hitch resulting in accrual
of intending migrants waiting for an opening. While fear
of the disease is not a factor that stops migrants, the
movement restrictions associated with the pandemic
does (John, 2020). As soon as borders open again,
Nigerian, Moroccan, Libyan and Europeans authorities,
especially Spain and Italy, will have a hectic job of polic-
ing borders, deserts and waters to save lives and ensure
adherence to national, regional and international laws
of migration such as the 2015 Nigerian Immigration
Act, the Law 2015–36, the ECOWAS’ Common Approach
on Migration and the UNHCR Policy Framework and
Implementation Strategy. This route, as confirmed by the
UNODC, is the most frequented by irregular migrants
originating “from the Gulf of Guinea, crosses Mali and
Niger and leads North, through Algeria, where it bifur-
cates east towards Libya and west towards Morocco.
Agadez in Niger, Gao and Kidal in Mali, and Tamanrasset
in Algeria are transit nodes” (UNODC, 2010).
After a temporary reduction in mobility along the
Sub-Saharan and Mediterranean routes, migration flows
from less developed countries have already picked up
in June and the increase is sustained over the three
months that follows, recording a total of 13,150 ille-
gal crossings (UNODC, 2010), an increase of 155% from
last year (Bielby, 2020; Yayboke, 2020). These findings
validate the Raveinstein’s (1885) claims that migrants
are more inclined to short journeys thereby moving to
nearby economic hubs on routes to destinations. This
is because migrants along the Nigeria/Niger/Libya corri-
dor are found to be organising their journeys in stages.
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They first assemble in the Nigerian cities of Kano or
Katsina, where they usually engage agents and some-
times make payments before stopping again in cities
like Agadez or Dirkou (Niger) to work and earn money
to facilitate the journey. Here they wait for the ‘right
moment’ to move, as determined by the travel agents.
When they reach Libya or Morocco, again they wait for
another ‘right moment’ to sail across theMediterranean.
Nigerian migrants usually regroup in Nigerian cities such
as Kano and Katsina and pay for their journeys in advance
before reaching the doors of the Sahara via Nigerien
cities such as Agadez and Niamey (UNODC, 2011).
This is because an increase in the rate of irregular
migration from Nigeria and other West African coun-
tries to Europe after Covid-19 looks impending (Yayboke,
2020), and factors that accelerate the increase such as
economic failures due to low oil prices (Onyekwena &
Ekeruche, 2020), insurgency and other forms of inse-
curity (World Bank, 2020b), desertification and climate
change-induced agricultural failures abound in Nigeria
making the country’s recession in worst in four decades
(World Bank, 2020c). In this sense, uncertainties around
Covid-19 and border crossing add just a little bit to a
long list of uncertainties that characterise the expected
migration experience of the respondents. On the pull
side, the real and perceived opportunities in Europe
makes migrants consider their journey a solution to mis-
ery, and thereby worth taking risks even through danger-
ous paths.
Imminently, the future of migration in West Africa
will be dominated by smugglers and traffickers alike who
masquerade as travel agencies and operate through clan-
destine methods to lure migrants (UNODC, 2020a) often
robbing migrants on the way and abandoning them in
the desert (BenSaad, 2003). With rising migrants’ des-
peration and determined border surveillance by national
authorities, travel agents claim to provide the solution
which eventually attract lots of migrants (Fleshman,
2009; Shelley, 2014) resulting in more Nigerians being
stranded in North Africa after unsuccessful attempts
to reach Europe (UNODC, 2011). National and multi-
national arrangements to curb irregular migration and
human trafficking will therefore face hectic times to deal
with voyages of doom (Sawadogo, 2012)
Most migrants are building their hope on hearsay
and fantasising European lifestyles without certainty of
reaching Europe, obtaining a job and living a decent life.
However, it can be hypothesised that with closure of
companies and other economic activities in Europe, jobs
are likely to be scarce, making it difficult to accommo-
date the stock of migrants heading to theMediterranean
waters to reach Europe. In the long run, a high supply of
the migrant labour force, and a shortage of work oppor-
tunities will result in increasing migrant unemployment
and migrants’ willingness to return home while some
may could be forced by circumstances to accept demean-
ing undeclared works with low pay, increased hours of
work and against the national labour labour especially
in agriculture and the building industry (International
Labour Organisation, 2010) while the authorities and
company owners leverage on the exploitation of cheap
labour that enables them derive huge profits and afford
the citizens opportunity to purchase quality produces
at comparatively low prices (Bell, 2003). Millions of
migrant workers battling poverty and unemployment
are already returning home across the world after los-
ing their jobs due to Covid-19 (International Labour
Organisation, 2020). In Spain, migrant unemployment
increased after the onset of Covid-19 to 70,200 (24% of
total migrant population in the country) compared to
15,200 among nationals (European Union, 2020).
Uncertainty and Fear of social rejection and health
induced stigmatisation could become certain especially
when they reach Europe without proper documentation
that will indicate their health status. This could be worse
if European far right politicians use Covid-19 excuses to
push for more restrictions against migrants which could
affect social inclusion initiatives across the continent
(Vertovec, 2020).
Most of the findings support Lee’s (1966) assump-
tions that in both place of origin and place of destination
there are many positive factors that keep people from
moving and attract others to come in as well as nega-
tive factors that send people away and repel migrants.
The essentiality of negative and positive factors in taking
migration decision is however shaped by personal fac-
tors such as knowledge, awareness, intelligence, social
connection and perception of the negative and positive
factors that can be easily exaggerated or underplayed
depending on the personal factors (Amaral, 2018). This
explains the perceived greener pasture in Europe and
repelling factors in Nigeria.
Hence, uncertainty regarding fears and expectations
as perceived by individuals control decision of migrants
moving from Nigeria through dangerous intervening
obstacles to Europe.
8. Conclusion
This article examines the perceptions of Nigerian
migrants en route to Europe via Niger who were affected
by the Covid-19 movement restrictions. It documents
their feelings, fears, living conditions and expectations
with particular reference to the relationship between the
pandemic and the intention or otherwise of migrants to
engage in the voyage to Europe amidst the uncertain-
ties and restriction wrought by the pandemic. This arti-
cle reviewed stakeholder perceptions and related them
to current literature in the field to validate claims, exam-
inemigration trends and predict future ofmigration from
Nigeria to Europe.
The article concludes that migration—especially
irregular movements—will probably increase in post
Covid-19 times, as the respondents regard the pandemic
only as a temporary setback as the decision to migrate
to Europe remains unchanged. On the journey however,
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migrants lived in difficult socioeconomic circumstances
including personal and food insecurity, lack of shelter,
and health challenges. As found by other researchers
(Anderson, 2016; BenSaad, 2003), this article confirmed
that migrants are often stripped of their properties,
robbed and called degrading names while on transit
especially where they arewarehoused, tortured andmal-
treated with impunity in transit countries. Migrants also
face challenges from the activities of traffickers that are
cashing on migrants’ desperation. Impliedly, the current
consideration of migration across the Mediterranean as
both a security and humanitarian challenge will con-
tinue beyond the pandemic in a passion described by
Norman Myers and Jacques Chirac (as cited in Haas,
2008, p. 2) as a “flood” and the likely response of
curtailing it will increase the propensity of trafficking
(Haas, 2008) because the business blossoms whenever
countries put more pressure to curtail illegal migration
(Anderson, 2016). Thus, expectations of migrants when
they reach Europemirrors a flipped coin that is still in the
air, either a greener pasture or a life of regret.
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